Which given the budgets that most schools have for equipment, software and staff is currently entirely reasonable.
It’s probably doable if a country pushed to create a defacto well documented distribution that’s paired with a MDM and online office suite. Basically replicate a locked down Chromebook environment, a lot of edu resources are online these days so most activity is through the browser.
EU Office appears to be the start down that road.
So say for example that someone manages to get into a position (or the Bitwarden Devs) to alter the code for the Bitwarden Chrome extension and compromise it, this code is then deployed from their update service to your device. You then use the compromised extension to login to your vault, at that point your vault contents could be extracted for a third-party to view.
I just want to say, this was something I saw another user put up as a risk on another thread a few months back, so I don’t know if that’s actually feasible to achieve or what protections Bitwarden have in place to stop such a thing happening.
Even so, I still use Bitwarden. If you’re getting that deep into the weeds, unless you are writing all the code yourself or interrogating the code others put up before updating your system this sort of thing would always appear to be a risk.
The only concern I have seen written is if someone altered how the bitwarden client / extension itself works to expose / extract your vault. Not sure how feasible that would be.
To use WSB slang - Regard I assume.